This volume has two primary aims: to trace the traditions and changes in methods concepts and ideas that brought forth the logical empiricistsâ philosophy of physics and to present and analyze the logical empiricistsâ various and occasionally contrary ideas about the physical sciences and their philosophical relevance. These original chapters discuss these developments in their original contexts and social and institutional environments thus showing the various fruitful conceptions and philosophies behind the history of 20th-century philosophy of science. Logical Empiricism and the Natural Sciences is divided into three thematic sections. Part I surveys the influences on logical empiricismâs philosophy of science and physics. It features chapters on Maxwellâs role in the worldview of logical empiricism on Reichenbachâs account of objectivity on the impact of Poincarà on Neurathâs early views on scientific method Frankâs exchanges with Einstein about philosophy of physics and on the forgotten role of Kurt Grelling. Part II focuses on specific physical theories including Carnapâs and Reichenbachâs positions on Einsteinâs theory of general relativity Reichenbachâs critique of unified field theory and the logical empiricistsâ reactions to quantum mechanics. The third and final group of chapters widens the scope to philosophy of science and physics in general. It includes contributions on von Misesâ frequentism; Frankâs account of concept formation and confirmation; and the interrelations between Nagelâs Feiglâs and Hempelâs versions of logical empiricism. This book offers a comprehensive account of the logical empiricistsâ philosophy of physics. It is a valuable resource for researchers interested in the history and philosophy of science philosophy of physics and the history of analytic philosophy. . Language: English